get textual description of alert information
openssl/ssl.h>const char *
SSL_alert_type_string(int value);const char *
SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);const char *
SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);const char *
- This indicates that no support is available for this alert type. Probably value does not contain a correct alert message.
- "CN"/"close notify"
- The connection shall be closed. This is a warning alert.
- "UM"/"unexpected message"
- An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations.
- "BM"/"bad record mac"
- This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. This message is always fatal.
- "DF"/"decompression failure"
- The decompression function received improper input (e.g., data that would expand to excessive length). This message is always fatal.
- "HF"/"handshake failure"
- Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available. This is a fatal error.
- "NC"/"no certificate"
- A client, that was asked to send a certificate, does not send a certificate (SSLv3 only).
- "BC"/"bad certificate"
- A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc.
- "UC"/"unsupported certificate"
- A certificate was of an unsupported type.
- "CR"/"certificate revoked"
- A certificate was revoked by its signer.
- "CE"/"certificate expired"
- A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
- "CU"/"certificate unknown"
- Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.
- "IP"/"illegal parameter"
- A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. This is always fatal.
- "DC"/"decryption failed"
- A TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn't an even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal.
- "RO"/"record overflow"
- A TLSCiphertext record was received which had a length more than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always fatal.
- "CA"/"unknown CA"
- A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This message is always fatal.
- "AD"/"access denied"
- A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation. This message is always fatal.
- "DE"/"decode error"
- A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This message is always fatal.
- "CY"/"decrypt error"
- A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, or validate a finished message.
- "ER"/"export restriction"
- A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions was detected; for example, attempting to transfer a 1024 bit ephemeral RSA key for the RSA_EXPORT handshake method. This message is always fatal.
- "PV"/"protocol version"
- The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is recognized, but not supported. (For example, old protocol versions might be avoided for security reasons.) This message is always fatal.
- "IS"/"insufficient security"
- Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. This message is always fatal.
- "IE"/"internal error"
- An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol makes it impossible to continue (such as a memory allocation failure). This message is always fatal.
- "US"/"user canceled"
- This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a close_notify. This message is generally a warning.
- "NR"/"no renegotiation"
- Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert; at that point, the original requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case where this would be appropriate would be where a server has spawned a process to satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup and it might be difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point. This message is always a warning.
- "UP"/"unknown PSK identity"
- Sent by the server to indicate that it does not recognize a PSK identity or an SRP identity.
- This indicates that no description is available for this alert type. Probably value does not contain a correct alert message.